This series consists of talks in the area of Foundations of Quantum Theory. Seminar and group meetings will alternate.
Violation of local realism can be probed by theory–independent tests, such as Bell’s inequality experiments. There, a common assumption is the existence of perfect, classical, reference frames, which allow for the specification of measurement settings with arbitrary precision. However, if the reference frames are ``bounded'', only limited precision can be attained. We expect then that the finiteness of the reference frames limits the observability of genuine quantum features.
Although most realistic approaches to quantum theory are based on classical particles, QFT reveals that classical fields are a much closer analog. And unlike quantum fields, classical fields can be extrapolated to curved spacetime without conceptual difficulty. These facts make it tempting to reconsider whether quantum theory might be reformulated on an underlying classical field structure.
Researchers in quantum foundations claim (D'Ariano, Fuchs, ...):
Quantum = probability theory + x
and hence:
x = Quantum - probability theory
Guided by the metaphorical analogy:
probability theory / x = flesh / bones
we introduce a notion of quantum measurement within x, which, when flesing it with Hilbert spaces, provides orthodox quantum mechanical probability calculus.
We know the mathematical laws of quantum mechanics, but as yet we are not so sure why those laws should be inevitable. In the simpler but related environment of classical inference, we also know the laws (of probability). With better understanding of quantum mechanics as the eventual goal, Kevin Knuth and I have been probing the foundations of inference. The world we wish to infer is a partially-ordered set ('poset') of states, which may as often supposed be exclusive, but need not be (e.g. A might be a requirement for B).
Eugene Wigner and Hermann Weyl led the way in applying the theory of group representations to the newly formulated theory of quantum mechanics starting in 1927. My talk will focus, first, on two aspects of this early work. Physicists had long exploited symmetries as a way of simplifying problems within classical physics.
Quantum foundations in the light of gauge theories We will present the conjecture according to which the fact that q and p cannot be both ``observables'' of the same quantum system indicates that there is a remnant universal symmetry acting on classical states. In order to unpack this claim we will generalize to unconstrained systems the gauge correspondence between properties defined by first-class constraints and gauge symmetries generated by these constraints.
Quantum mechanics is a non-classical probability theory, but hardly the most general one imaginable: any compact convex set can serve as the state space for an abstract probabilistic model (classical models corresponding to simplices). From this altitude, one sees that many phenomena commonly regarded as ``characteristically quantum' are in fact generically ``non-classical'. In this talk, I'll show that almost any non-classical probabilistic theory shares with quantum mechanics a notion of entanglement and, with this, a version of the so-called measurement problem.
A standard canonical quantization of general relativity yields a time-independent Schroedinger equation whose solutions are static wavefunctions on configuration space. Naively this is in contradiction with the real world where things do change. Broadly speaking, the problem how to reconcile a theory which contains no concept of time with a changing world is called 'the problem of time'.
The essential ingredients of a quantum theory are usually a Hilbert space of states and an algebra of operators encoding observables. The mathematical operations available with these structures translate fairly well into physical operations (preparation, measurement etc.) in a non-relativistic world. This correspondence weakens in quantum field theory, where the direct operational meaning of the observable algebra structure (encoded usually through commutators) is lost.
Both classical probability theory and quantum theory lend themselves to a Bayesian interpretation where probabilities represent degrees of belief, and where the various rules for combining and updating probabilities are but algorithms for plausible reasoning in the face of uncertainty. I elucidate the differences and commonalities of these two theories, and argue that they are in fact the only two algorithms to satisfy certain basic consistency requirements.